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The Meaning of "Religion"
in the School Prayer Cases
The Supreme Court has read into the establishment clause of the
First Amendment a definition of the word "religion" which is proper
only to the free exercise clause of that amendment, the author asserts.
In employing this improper definition under the establishment clause
in the school prayer cases, the Court has tended to institutionalize
agnosticism as the official public religion.

by Charles E.

Rice

IN THE CONTROVERSY over the
school prayer decisions, both sides have
virtually ignored the incongruity of the
Supreme Court's definition of religion. For, in fact, the Court has read
into the establishment clause of the
First Amendment a definition of the
word which is proper only to the
free exercise clause of that amendment. The effect of this quiet mutation is far-reaching indeed.
That part of the First Amendment
which deals with religion reads:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof
The original meaning of the
* . .".
first clause is clear. Said Judge
Thomas Cooley: "By establishment of
religion is meant the setting up or
recognition of a state church, or at
least the conferring upon one church
of special favors and advantages
which are denied to others." 1 The
amendment was prompted by the circumstance that, in the words of James
Madison during the debate in Congress over its adoption, "the people
feared one sect might obtain a pre.
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eminence, or two combine together,
and establish a religion to which they
would compel others to conform." 2 It
was the purpose of the establishment
clause, then, to prevent the prescription by Congress of "a national faith",
that is, a nationally established official
church.'
It has been asserted, and incorrectly
so, that the establishment clause ordained a governmental abstention
from all matters of religion, a neutrality, as it were, between those who
believe in God and those who do not.
An examination of the history of the
clause, however, will not sustain that
analysis. Its end was neutrality, but
only of a sort. It commanded impartiality on the part of government as
amnong the various sects of theistic
religions, that is, religions that profess a belief in God. But, as between
theistic religions and those nontheistic creeds that do not acknowledge
God, the precept of neutrality under
the establishment clause did not obtain. Government, conformably to the
establishment clause, could generate
an affirmative atmosphere of hospitality

toward theistic religion, so long as no
substantial partiality was shown toward
any particular theistic sect or combination of sects.
Historical Meaning
of the First Amendment
Justice Joseph Story, who served
on the Supreme Court from 1811 to
1845 and who was a leading Unitarian, confirmed the plain historical
meaning of the First Amendment:
Probably at the time of the adoption
of the Constitution, and of the first
amendment to it ... the general if not
the universal sentiment in America. was,
that Christianity ought to receive encouragement from the state so far as
was not incompatible with the private
rights of conscience and the freedom of
religious worship. An attempt to level
all religions, and to make it a matter of
state policy to hold all in utter indifference, would have created universal disapprobation, if not universal indignation.
1. COOLEY, PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,
224 (1898).
2. 1 ANNALS Or CONG. 731 (1789).
3. Corwin, The Supreme Court as National
School Board, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROS. 3, 11-12

(1949).
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The real object of the amendment
was not to countenance, much less to
advance, Mahometanism, or Judaism,
or infidelity, by prostrating Christianity; but to exclude all rivalry among
Christian sects, and to prevent any
national ecclesiastical establishment
which should give to a hierarchy the
of the national
exclusive patronage
4
government.
Logically, this means that for purposes of the establishment clause nontheistic beliefs were riot considered to
be religions. Otherwise, an affirmation
by government that there is a God
would be a governmental preference,
through the assertion of the essential
truth of theism, of a combination of
religious sects, i.e., those that believe
in God, to the disparagement of those
other religions which do not profess
such a belief. On the contrary, rather
than regarding theism and nontheism
as merely variant religious sects within a broadly defined category of "religion". the establishment clause regarded theism as the common denominator of all religions, and nontheism
it considered not to be a religion at all.
Government itself could profess a belief in God, and, so long as a practical
neutrality was maintained among theistic sects, the neutrality command of
the establishment clause would not be
breached.
That it was not a purpose of the establishment clause to forbid such a
profession by government of the truth
of theism, or to forbid all official governmental sanction of public prayer,
is shown by the fact that on September
24, 1789, the very same day that it
approved the First Amendment, Congress called on the President to proclaim a national day of thanksgiving
and prayer, in the following resolution:
That a joint committee of both
Houses be directed to wait upon the
President of the United States to request that he would recommend to the
people of the United States a day of
public thanksgiving and prayer, to be
observed by acknowledging, with grateful hearts, the many signal favors of
Almighty God, especially by affording
them an opportunity peaceably to establish a Constitution of government
for their safety and happiness.5
President Washington issued the
thanksgiving proclamation on October
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3, 1789, and every President, except
Thomas Jefferson and Andrew Jackson,
has followed suit.
Would it not have been extraordinary for Congress to request a public
day of prayer to be observed by "the
people of the United States" and on
the very same day to propose a constitutional amendment to prohibit that
very type of prayer? Indeed, the specific religious issue was raised by Representative Thomas Tucker of South
Carolina in the debate preceding the
adoption of the resolution. Mr. Tucker
objected that calling on the President
to proclaim a day of prayer "is a business with which Congress have nothing
to do; it is a religious matter, and, as
such, is proscribed to us." 6 Congress,
however, passed the resolution.
If the question of Congress's competence in religious matters had not been
raised, it could possibly be said that it
had never occurred to the members
and therefore the action of Congress
ought not to be conclusive on the point.
When, however, the issue was squarely
joined, the First Congress deliberately
overrode the same objections we hear
so often today and voted to offer public prayer to God.
Definitions of Religion
Are Given by the Court
The history and informed logic of
the establishment clause, therefore,
lead to the conclusion that its definition of religion was similar to that used
by Chief Justice Hughes in his dissenting opinion in a 1931 case involving the eligibility of a pacifist for
naturalization:
.. . The essence of religion is belief
in a relation to God involving duties
superior to those arising from any huOne cannot speak
man relation ....
of religious liberty, with proper appreciation of its essential and historic significance, without assuming the existence of a belief in7 supreme allegiance
to the will of God.
For many years, it was assumed that
the same definition of religion applied
to the free exercise clause of the First
Amendment, so that the clause, it could
be argued, protected only theistic beliefs against governmental prohibition.
Thus, in Davis v. Beason, 133 U. S.
333 at 342 (1890), the Supreme Court
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said, "The term 'religion' has reference to one's views of his relations to
his Creator, and to the obligations they
impose of reverence for his being and
character, and of obedience to his will."
In the Davis case, the Court held that
the federal law prohibiting polygamy
was not an infringement upon the religious freedom of the defendant.
It is obvious, however, that believers in nontheistic creeds, such as atheists and agnostics, should be protcctcd
in the free exercise of their religion as
fully as are Baptists and Presbyterians.
And it ought not to be inferred, from
the theistic definition of religion employed by the Court in the Davis case
that, if the issue were presented to it,
the Supreme Court would not have accorded the protection of the free exercise clause to atheists and agnostics
even at the time when the Court was
formulating its theistic definition of religion. The equity and reason of the
matter are plain. Moreover, as Mr.
Justice Brennan properly acknowledged in his concurring opinion in the
Schempp case :
[O]ur religious composition makes us
a vastly more diverse people than were
our forefathers. They knew differences
chiefly among Protestant sects. Today
the Nation is far more heterogeneous
religiously, including as it does substantial minorities not only of Catholics
and Jews but as well of those who worship according to no version of the
Bible and those who worship no God at
all 8
It is correct beyond dispute that the
scttled protections of the free exercise
clause ought to be extended today to
such nontheistic creeds as atheism and
agnosticism. This conclusion, apparently, determined the decision in Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U. S. 488 (1961),
in which the Court invalidated a provision of the Constitution of Maryland
requiring a state employee to declare
his belief in God. The test, said Justice Black for the Court, unconstitutionally invaded the employee's "freedom of belief and religion". The re4. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES § 1874 and 1877 (1891).

5. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 949 (1789).
6. 1 ANNALS Or CONG. 950 (1789).
7. United States v. Macintosh, 283 U. S. 605,
633-634 (193t).
8. Abington Schoot District v. Schen pp, 374

U. S. 203, 240 (1963).
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quirement was invalid because "The
power and authority of the State of
Maryland thus is put on the side of one
particular sort of believers-those who
are willing to say they believe in 'the
existence of God'." The Court went on
to spell out the entitlement of nontheistie beliefs to protection as religions:
We repeat and again reaffirm that
neither a State nor the Federal Government can constitutionally force a person "to profess his belief or disbelief in
any religion." Neither can constitutionally pass laws or impose requirements
which aid all religions as against nonbelievers, and neither can aid those
religions based on a belief in the exist.

ence of God as against those religions
founded on different beliefs. 9 [Empha-

sis added.]
Appended to the last quoted clause
was a footnote specifying that: "Among
religions in this country which do not
teach what would commonly be considered a belief in the existence of God are
Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture,
Secular Humanism and others."
The Court's reliance on Mr. Torcaso's "freedom of belief and religion"
leaves some doubt as to whether the
decision rests on establishment clause
or free exercise clause grounds. However, it probably did rest on the latter,
and the decision is supportable in that
sense, because the free exercise clause
ought to interdict states Iassuming, as
the Court has held, that the First
Amendment is applied fully to the
states through the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment) from
barring nonbelievers in God from general state employment.
Two Types of Religions
Are Now Protected
In view of the holding in Torcaso, it
may now be said that there are two
general types of religions entitled to
the protections of the First Amendment.
On the one hand are those which
profess a belief in God. For purposes
of discussion, let us call them theistic,
and for analysis we shall include therein both deistic and theistic beliefs in
God with their variant interpretations
of the nature of God and His providence.
On the other hand are those non-

theistic religions described in Justice
Black's footnote in the Torcaso case.
Of the four nontheistic religions mentioned by him, the two most important
in contemporary terms are Ethical
Culture and Secular Humanism, which
are nontheistic in that they do not
affirm the existence of God. It is
reasonable also to include unorganized
atheism and agnosticism within the
Torcaso definition of nontheistic religion. While atheism flatly rejects a
belief in the existence of God, agnosticism is: "The doctrine that neither the
existence nor the nature of God, nor
the ultimate origin of the universe, is
known or knowable . . .",j Atheism
and agnosticism are both compatible
with Ethical Culture and Secular Humanism; they arc as much entitled to
constitutional treatment as religions as
are those latter beliefs.
The vice of the Torcaso case is that
the Court did not spell out the grounds
of the ruling and did not limit its new
and broader definition of religion to the
area of free exercise rather than that of
establishment. Regrettably, the Supreme Court has now taken its Toreaso
definition of religion and applied it
without apparent reservation to the establishment clause.
In the first of the school prayer decisions,11 the Court did not cite any
cases in support of its determination.
The ruling seemed to rest on an assumed incapacity of government, under the First Amendment, to write or
sanction "official prayers" of any type,
at least in public schools. The Court
did not dwell on the reason for the incapacity, but it was intimated by Justice Black, speaking for the majority,
when he noted in passing: "When the
power, prestige and financial support
of government is placed behind a particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved religion is plain" (emphasis added). What Justice Black
hinted at here was the same concept of
neutrality explicitly found controlling
one year later in the Schempp case.
There Justice Clark rested his opinion for the Court on "the concept of
neutrality", which operates to prevent
a situation where the "official support
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of the state or Federal Government
would be placed behind the tenets of
one or of all orthodoxies". Engel and
Schempp, of course, were decided solely as establishment clause cases. And,
to emphasize the content of the neutrality which it now finds in the establishment clause, the majority opinion in Schempp quoted in support an
extract from Torcaso explicitly adopting the broad definition of religion:
We repeat and again reaffirm that
neither a State nor the Federal Government can constitutionally force a
person "to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion." Neither can constitutionally pass laws or impose requirements which aid all religions as
against non-believers, and neither can
aid those religions based on a belief in
the existence of God as against those
12
religions founded on different belieIs.
[Emphasis added.]
In view of the increased variety in
our religious composition, it is quite
proper for the Court to construe the
9. 367 U. S. at 495.
10. WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY,

UNABRIDGED (Second Edition).
11. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421 (1962).
12. 374 U. S. at 220, citing from opinion of
Justice Black for the Court in Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U. S. 488, 495 (1961).
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establishment clause to bar a law respecting a real "establishment", in the
limited historical sense of the word, of
either a theistic or nontheistic sect.
But the Court has gone much further
and is construing the clause, with its
newly incorporated definition of religion, in absolutist terms, affirming that
our "constitutional policy" denies, when
"religious training, teaching or observance" are concerned, "that the state
can undertake or sustain them in any
form or degree". 13
In his seventy-four page concurring
opinion in Schempp, Justice Brennan
probed the deeper meaning of the
Court's ruling and strained to demonstrate that the decision was not a precursor of further extreme rulings. Yet
the best he could do on the words "under God" in the pledge of allegiance
was to say that: "The reference to divinity in the revised pledge of allegiance, for example, may merely recognize the historical fact that our Nation was believed to have been founded
'under God'."
The pledge, in Justice Brennan's
view, is merely one of "the various
patriotic exercises and activities used
in the public schools and elsewhere
which, whatever may have been their
origins, no longer have a religious purpose or meaning".' 4
Justice Brennan has supplied the

key the Court is likely to use to decide
if an exercise is "religious" or merely a
harmless "patriotic or ceremonial" one.
That is, if it is to be taken seriously,
it is therefore at least in part a "religious exercise", and as such it is prohibited by the First Amendment. Only
if it is a mere affirmation of the historical fact that the founders believed in
the overlordship of God, or that some
Americans now so believe, and only if
it scrupulously avoids any affirmation
of the truth or falsity of that belief in
God, can the observance be insulated
from constitutional attack.
This rationale necessarily would prevent an affirmation by a teacher or
other government official that, in fact,
the Declaration of Independence is
true when it asserts that men are endowed "by their Creator" with unalienable rights or when it asserts the
existence of "the laws of nature and of
nature's God", a "Supreme Judge of
the world" and "Divine Providence".
In the nature of things, governmental neutrality on the question of God's
existence is unattainable. A govern.
mental assertion that God does in fact
exist is a preferential affirmation of the
truth of theism; an assertion that God
does not exist is a preference of atheism; and a perpetual suspension of
judgment by government on the question is an adoption of the agnostic,
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nontheistic position through the inplicit assertion that, as a matter of
state policy, the existence of God is
unknown or unknowable. In the school
prayer cases the Court appears to have
adopted an agnostic approach which is
incompatible, in its treatment of the
basic question of God's existence, with
the basic theistic affirmation which was
theretofore embedded in our law and
tradition.
It is not my purpose here to discuss
the possible extensions of the school
prayer decisions. Rather, I am concerned only with the thought that the
unqualified incorporation of the broad
definition of religion into the estabblishment clause is perhaps the root
fallacy in the Court's reasoning. In
order to avoid an institutionalization
of agnosticism as the official public religion of this country, the Court
ought to acknowledge that nontheistic
religions are not entitled to such unqualified recognition under the establishment clause as to bar even a simple
governmental affirmation that in fact
the Declaration of Independence is
true when it states the existence of
God.
13. Abington School District v. Scherupp, 374
U. S. 203, 218 (1963), quoting from dissenting
opinion of Justice Rutledge, joined by Justices
Frankfurter, Jackson and Bnurton, in Everson v.
Board of Edvcation, 2.30 U. S. 1, 52 (1947).
14. Quotations from 374 U. S. 303, 304.
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